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I INTRODUCTION 
This essay will focus on the "Tlu·ee Strikes" law. A "Three Strikes" law is a 
tlu-ee-chance system for violent offenders. If a person commits two crimes from a 
defined list, and then goes on to commit a third crime on the list, they will be 
incarcerated for an extended period of time. The Bill proposed for New Zealand is 
formally known as the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill. The Bill began as ACT's 
law and order policy. ACT stated that they would introduce a Bill designed to target 
the worst offenders. 1 National went on to win the 2008 election, bringing ACT into 
power with it. This has resulted in the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill. The Bill is 
aimed at violent offenders only. On conviction for a second "strike" offence, the 
criminal will receive the maximum penalty for that offence, and a warning of the 
consequences of a third "strike" conviction. A person convicted of a third "strike" 
offence will go to jail for 25 years to life. There is no judicial discretion.2 This essay 
will look at the current sentencing laws in New Zealand, explore the mechanics of the 
proposed bill, its potential benefits and drawbacks, and discuss inconsistencies of the 
proposed legislation with human rights law. The effects of the California Three 
Strikes Law will be examined, and whether similar effects on New Zealand's court 
system or correctional system are likely. I will weigh these factors in concluding 
whether the "Three Strikes" law proposed would be a desirable addition to New 
Zealand's sentencing laws. 
1 ACT party website www.act.org.nz (accessed 26/4) 
2 Ibid 
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II THE BILL, ITS BASE IN "THREE STRIKES" LAW, AND HOW THE 
BILL FITS IN WITH CURRENT SENTENCING LAW 
A "Three Strikes" laws 
"Three Strikes" Jaws are characterized by two factors. The first of these are 
strike offences. For offences to come under "Three Strikes" legislation, they must be 
recorded as strike offences. This can be done with a specific list of offences, or in 
some jurisdictions, any felony will be covered. The second of these factors is the 
punishments. An offender, on commission of a first offence, will receive the normal 
sentence, and a warning that repeated offences will lead to increased sentences. If a 
second offence is committed, an extended sentence will be given. The third offence, 
or strike, will result in an even longer sentence of up to life imprisonment. The length 
will be determined by the jurisdiction. In California, it is twenty-five years to life, 
with no release before serving eighty percent of the sentence. 3 
Formally, "Three Strikes" laws are known as "habitual-offender laws".
4 They 
have been around in one form or another throughout the twentieth century. In England 
and parts of the United States there were laws that could impose life imprisonment on 
the third felony offence.5 However, judges were able to use their discretion when 
determining a sentence, and rarely handed down these extended sentences.
6 
Washington was the first State in the US to turn these laws into the "Three 
Strikes" format. In 1993 , the voters of that State approved Initiative 593 . This law 
3 Zimring, Franklin, Hawkins, Gordon, Kamin, Sam Punishment and Democracy Three Strikes and 
You 're Out in California, Oxford University Press, 200 I, 7. 
4 Ibid, 4. 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
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focussed on selected cnmes, with a life sentence on the third offence. 7 California 
followed with its version of the law in 1994.8 By 1999 almost half the States had 
some form of "three strikes" law. 9 
The idea of the law is sufficiently fluid as to allow for variations between 
jurisdictions. In California, one must be convicted of two "serious or violent" crimes 
before the law will apply. Then on the third breach of the law, a twenty-five year to 
life sentence will be imposed. 1° California stands out from other jurisdictions that 
have enacted three strikes legislation. Jones and Newburn point out that while most 
jurisdictions passed three strikes laws as a largely symbolic measure, California has 
drafted theirs in such a way that it operates more broadly than the title suggests. 11 In 
some States such as Washington, the law has been carefully drafted so that few 
offenders will be affected by it, while still attracting votes from the public. 12 This 
shows that the law can be tweaked and changed to suit specific jurisdictions. 
B Current Sentencing Law in New Zealand 
The Sentencing Act 2002 13 is the current sentencing law in New Zealand. It 
sets out the general purposes and principals to be used when sentencing. Section 8 
sets out the principles of sentencing offenders. There are ten principles which Judges 
must follow when sentencing an offender. These principles are varied, and range from 
section 8(c), which states that the Judge must impose the maximum sentence if the 
7 
Washington Legislature http: //www.leg.wa.gov/ legislature (accessed 25 May 2009) 
6 
Legislative Analyst ' s Office California http://www.lao.ca.gov (accessed 25 May 2009) 
9 
Three Strikes.org www.threestrikes.org (accessed 25 May 2009) 
10 
Zimring, Hawkins, Kamin above n 3, 8 
11 
Jones, T Newburn, T Three Strikes and You 're Out 2006 46 British Journal of Criminolooy 784 791 
12 Ibid 791 "' ' 
13 Sen;encing Act 2002 
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offence is within the most serious cases of that kind of offence, 
14 to the impact of the 
crime on the victim in section S(f).
15 
Section 8 of the Sentencing Act must be followed. In addition, a judge must have 
regard to section 9, which concerns aggravating and mitigating factors. An 
aggravating factor in the commission of a crime, such as particular cruelty in the 
commission of the offence, or premeditation on the part of the offender may lead to a 
harsher sentence. 
16 
Conversely, under section 9(2) , the court must take mitigating factors into account, 
such as whether the offender pleaded guilty, and if there is evidence of the offender's 
previous good character.
17 Within these guidelines, the court will weigh up all the 
factors relevant and sentence the offender to what it considers an appropriate term. 
However, within the act there are various ways for the court to tailor the sentence in 
order to suit the offender and the crime committed. Section 9( 4) is one such example: 
"Nothing in subsection (1) or subsection (2) prevents the court from taking into 
account any other . . . factor that the court thinks fit ; or implies that a factor refetTed to 
in those subsections must be given greater weight than any other factor that the court 
might take into account." 
18 
The court is free to make the sentence that it believes is best. The judge 
presiding is given discretion as to how to apply the act to the particular facts before 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid s9 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid, s9 (4) 
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him. There is no mandatory minimum sentence that must be applied, with limited 
exceptions, such as the minimum non-parole period for murder. 19 
C The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 
The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill20 proposes a form of "Three Strikes 
Law" in New Zealand. The bill works as follows. There is a list of "serious violent 
offences"21 under section 86A. Commission of any of these offences will count as a 
"strike" . If an offender is convicted of a "serious violent offence" they will receive the 
normal sentence for that crime. Section 86B(2)(a) provides that the offender must be 
given a warning of the consequences of further offending. It must be noted that only 
those over 18 can receive a first warning and thus a first strike, as detailed further 
below. 
If the offender goes on to commit a second "serious violent offence", and the court 
sentences them to determinate imprisonment, the consequences will be severe. The 
maximum possible sentence will be handed down, and the sentence must be served 
without parole. 22 A final warning will also be given to the offender under section 
86C(3). If the second strike offence is murder, the punishment is even more severe: 
Under section 86E, the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment for life, with a 
minimum imprisonment period of 25 years, unless it would be manifestly unjust to do 
so.23 
If an offender, after the two warnings given, is convicted of a third "serious violent 
19 
Ibid 
20 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill , no 17-1 
2 1 Ibid s86A 
22 Ibid s86C 
23 Ibid s86E 
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offence", they will receive a third "strike". Section 86D states:
24 
(I) This section applies if-
(a) an offender who has a record of a final warning commits a serious violent offence; and 
(b) the court would, but for this section, impose a further qualifying sentence, other than a 
sentence of imprisonment for life for murder for that offence. 
(2) If this section applies, the court must-
(a) impose a sentence of imprisonment for life ... 
D Preventive Detention 
This is against the background of legislation that already exists, which is 
aimed at the worst repeat offenders. Section 87 of the Sentencing Act 2002 allows a 
court to impose preventive detention. The section gives the purpose as, "The purpose 
of preventive detention is to protect the community from those who pose a significant 
and ongoing risk to the safety of its members. "
25 It also has criteria:26 
2. This section applies if-
(a) a person is convicted of a qualifying sexual or violent offence (as that term is defined in 
subsection (5)) ; and 
(b) the person was 18 years of age or over at the time of committing the offence; and 
(c) the cowt is satisfied that the person is likely to commit another qualifying sexual or violent 
offence if the person is released at the sentence expiry date (as specified in subpart 3 of Pait I 
of the Parole Act 2002) of any sentence, other than a sentence under thi s section, that the court 
is able to impose. 
24 Ibid s86D 
25 Sentencing Act 2002 above n 13 s87(1) 
26 Ibid s87(2) 
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New Zealand therefore already allows for a more severe penalty for repeat violent 
offenders, serving the same purpose as "Three Strikes" legislation. The difference is 
the discretion available to the judges. Of course, the courts must look at various 
factors. 27 It seems the Parole and Sentencing (Reform) Bill will replace this. The 
discretion and flexibility of sentences is taken away and replaced with a "one size fits 
all" approach, regardless of the circumstances of the offender. 
The Law Commission has advocated the widening of preventive detention 
laws, instead of enacting this Bill.28 This seems to be a good solution. Preventive 
detention laws allow the offender to be punished more stringently, but within the 
system of checks and balances of the court system. Discretion being taken away from 
the judiciary and given to the legislature and the executives skirts the checks and 
balances put in place by the separation of powers. 
III POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE BILL IN NEW ZEALAND 
The ideas behind this law are straightforward. Specifically, it is to keep repeat 
offenders off the streets. The idea is that once a person has committed two offences, 
and still hasn ' t learned, or doesn ' t want to change their behaviour, then they should be 
punished more than usual. This is both general and specific deterrence. General 
deterrence aims to set an exan1ple so other would-be offenders will make different 
choices. Specific deten-ence is aimed at the individual offender, to persuade them to 
change their behaviour. When using individual deterrence and incapacitation as 
rationales for sentencing, the court must assess the risk of the criminal re-offending. 
This is known as risk assessment. Risk assessment means trying to predict the chances 
27 Ibid s87(4) 
28 Stuff website www.stuff.co.nz (accessed 9/6/09) 
JO 
of a given offender committing further crimes, which can be notoriously difficult. 29 
Risk assessment is discussed further in section V. 
There is also an element of selective incapacitation inherent in these laws. 
Studies have shown keeping high rate offenders imprisoned longer than low rate 
offenders can reduce crime.30 However the problem lies in accurately predicting 
which offenders come under which category. Because of things like social forces, 
situational factors, unstable patterns, unreliability of records and the fact that 
criminality often declines with age, it is very difficult to measure accurately criminal 
propensity. 31 In New Zealand this is dealt with by making previous convictions an 
"aggravating factor" in sentencing, where it has been shown that there is a "settled 
determination to break the law", as well as rewarding those without previous 
convictions, using lack of a criminal history as a "mitigating factor". 32 Selective 
incapacitation goes above and beyond the "just deserts" theory of punishment. This is 
further analysed in section V. 
There is a clear link between the ACT party and this legislation. However it 
could not have reached this stage without suppo1t from the National paity, who 
also made campaign promises to toughen up sentencing. 33 
National voted along with ACT and United Future on the first reading of the 
bill in Parliament. On the 18 February 2009 the bill was sent to the select committee 
29 Kemshall H Understanding Risk in Criminal Justice Open University Press England 2003, 65 
30 Haapanen, R Selective Incapacitation and the Serious Offender Springer Verlag New York 1990, 5 
31 Ibid, 143 
32 Ministry of Justice, Sentencing Policy and Guidance, Wellington, 1997, 99 - I 00 
33 National Party website http://www.national.org.nz (accessed 26/4/09) 
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after it passed the vote 64 to 58. The Labour party, the Maori party and the Greens 
d · · 34 vote agamst 1t. 
As campaign promises go, "Three Strikes" is a particularly good one. It is 
crystal clear and unashamedly tough. It vows to get serious on crime, and particularly 
violent crime, which people fear most. 35 However, there are dangers involved in 
basing policies around populism instead of facts and results. 
"Populist punitiveness" is a plu·ase that refers to political parties using, for 
their own gain, what they believe to be the public' s punitive stance.36 That is, they tap 
into the perceived punitive nature of the public when forming policy. The problem 
with this is that instead of forming policy based on the law reform commission and 
advisory bodies, it is instead based on public pressure and the media.37 While 
arguably more democratic, it can lead to laws that do not target the source of the 
problem, look good on paper but have few practical effects, or are costly but 
ineffective. 38 In terms of sentencing law, public opinion has lead to various pieces of 
legislation in different jurisdictions, including sex-offender registration, community 
notification schemes, "three strikes" provisions, and increased mandatory sentence 
lengths.39 
34 TVNZ website http://tvnz.co.nzJpolitics-news/ (accessed 1/6/09) 
35 Walters, R Bradley, T Introduction lo Criminological Thought New Zealand 2005 
36 Freiberg A, Gelb K Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy Hawkins Press 
2008, 3 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
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However John Pratt notes that while there is overall public endorsement of 
increased punitiveness in general terms,40 most members of the public, when asked 
their opinion on specific cases or specific policy give far more "nuanced and 
reflective"41 answers. In fact a 2006 opinion poll shows there is strong public support 
for community based sentencing, rather than building more prisons.42 
This shows that when political parties attempt to tap into the perceived 
punitiveness of the public, based on media reports and lobby groups, they may be 
heading in the wrong direction. But public sentiment is often based around perceived 
problems with crime, regardless of the actual realities of the situation, and pandering 
l . . 1 1 43 to t 1at sentiment wins e ectora votes. 
Hon Clayton Cosgrove of the Labour party states that it is little more than a 
"political pamphlet", designed to "play on the heaitstrings of victims."44 Here he is 
pointing out that it is a clear populist policy to appear tough on crime. But the actual 
effects of the bill will be negligible, not having an effect on any criminal for 15 to 20 
45 years. 
IV POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE BILL 
A Truth in Sentencing 
40 Pratt, J The Dark Side of Paradise 2006 46 British Journal of Criminology 542 
4 1 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid 
44 Hansard ( 18 February 2009) 642 NZPD 1420 
45 Ibid 
13 
Truth in sentencing refers to the average time served compared to the sentence 
handed down. For example, a prisoner who receives a 9-year sentence with no 
minimum parole period could be out in 3 years, one third of the sentence. If time 
served before the trial is added in, it could only be 18 months of a sentence served. 
Simon Power MP is the Minister for Justice. In his speech to Parliament he spoke 
in favour of the "three strikes" component, stating: "Under this legislation, the public 
and victims will be spared uncertainty about when or whether these violent offenders 
will be released on parole- they will not be." 46 His focus is on the victim - by taking 
away discretion, and having a fixed sentence, the victim will be "spared 
uncertainty. "4 7 
Under the Parole Act 2002, on average, inmates are serving around 62 percent of 
their sentence, which is longer than the average time served under the previous 
legislation.48 But this has not stopped, as the Law Commission puts it, "the oft-
repeated criticism that New Zealand lacks "truth in sentencing", which in turn 
undermines the credibility of the system and public confidence in it."49 
The problem with this is that not releasing prisoners early can have undesirable 
consequences. There is the issue of prison capacity, and the notion that leaving 
offenders in prison to serve their full term can have negative impacts in the pursuit of 
criminal justice. 50 Early release can be an effective tool in prison discipline, as an 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, Report 94, Law Commission, Wellington 2008, 47 49 Ibid 48 
50 Ibid, 51 
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incentive to better behaviour. It can also be used for "risk management", aiding in 
both rehabilitating offenders and preventing fu11her offending. 
51 52 
These goals can be met through different forms of truth in sentencing. One 
possible approach mooted by the Law Commission is changing the way the judge 
articulates the sentence. The judge would state both the actual sentence and the parole 
component. In addition, by shifting the parole component to two thirds of the 
sentence, the time offenders spend in jail would increase to 80% of the sentence, 
increasing "truth in sentencing" while still allowing the positive effects of early 
release. 53 
B Protecting the Public 
Protecting the public is another potential benefit. Simon Power MP states that 
these offenders have " ... shown contempt for the safety of others". By imposing 
greater sentences, he hopes to " ... protect the public from the worst repeat offenders." 
54 
David Garrett MP of the ACT party argues that less murders will be committed if 
this bill is passed. 55 
We know that this bill will work, because right now there are 77 murderers in jail who committed 
a murder at a time when they had three or more violent offences under their belt- 77 people ... 
5 1 Ibid 52 
52 App,leton and Grover showed this in their article "The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole'' 
Appleton, C and Grover, B The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole 2007 47 British Journal of 
Criminology 
53 Law Commission above n 48, 57 
54 Hansard above n 44 
55 Ibid 
15 
Their victims would be alive today if, at the time they were killed , this bill had been enforced. 
This statement fails to note many of the concerns about this legislation. 
Legislation cannot be enacted without fully comprehending all of the consequences. 
David Garrett MP fails to acknowledge the issues of human rights, the questionable 
effects of deterrence on offenders, and the costs involved that could be better spent on 
other policies. He goes on to say that there are "thousands" of violent offenders in the 
community with "dozens of violent convictions". 56 
He states that others will join those 77 murderers in jail. 57 Crime is a part of every 
society. But deterrence alone is not the way to reduce crime. 58 Simply :filling up our 
prisons will not reduce our crime rate. As Dame Sian Elias noted recently, different 
approaches need to be tried , such as greater spending and focus on early childhood 
education, more study on what makes a person offend, and rehabilitating offenders. 59 
As well , these facts have been disputed by some. As reported by the NZPA, 60 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid 
. . . Information provided under the Official Information Act to Rethinking Crime and 
Punishment's Kim Workman, an opponent of the policy, showed of the 423 prisoners serving 
life sentences not one would have been stopped by the proposed three-strikes law. 
58 Walters and Bradley above n 35, 57 
59 Dame Sian Elias, Supreme Court Chief Justice "Blameless Babes" (Annual Shirley Smith Address, 
New Zealand, 2009) 
60 Stuff website www.stuff.co.nz accessed 8/7 /09 
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None of the prisoners would have reached three-strikes before being given their life 
sentence ... 
David Garrett MP replied to this by stating that the original bill put forward by 
ACT would have had the stated effects, but not the bill sent to the select committee, as 
it had been changed by the National party.
61 
C Being Tough on Repeat Offenders 
This is the idea that repeat-offenders have been given chances to reform and have 
not, and therefore need to be treated more harshly. David Garrett MP puts forth the 
idea of giving people chances, but still being tough about it: 
62 
Kiwis are fair people; we do not want people to have no chances. This time he will get 12 years 
and he will serve 12 years. But if ·'M r. Scum bag" comes out of prison and commits another such 
offence again, he will go away for a sentence of 25 years to life. That is it. There is nothing 
magical or unfair about it. .. 
The problem here is the lack of discretion. It must be "manifestly unjust" for the 
court not to hand down the required sentence, which is a very high threshold to 
meet.63 This is discussed further in section V. 
D Deterrence 
6 1 Ibid 
62 Hansard, above n 44 
63 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill above n 20 s86D(3) 
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Deterrence is the idea that punishing offenders harshly deters them from 
committing crimes in the future. Here, a clear deterrence aim is announced. David 
Garrett MP states: 6 .. 
It will be costly but I support trying to stop people from becoming three-strikers ... What sensible 
person would want people to be locked up for 25 years or for life? The aim is to get felons to see where 
they are go ing, to decide they do not want to spend from 25 years to a lifetime in jail , and to change 
their ways. I am all for rehabilitation if it can work, but this bill is designed to protect people, and we 
know it will work because of the 77 in jail now. 
The problem with this is many offenders are not "sensible person(s)." 
Offenders when committing a crime do not always weigh up the costs and benefits of 
their actions.65 On the contrary, much violent crime is committed in "hot blood", in 
the spur of the moment.66 Bradley and Walters further note that a deterrence model 
based on increasing the length of imprisomnent often does not deter the criminal. 
Other factors need to be taken into account. 67 This is discussed further in section V. 
Ms Turei from the Green party highlights this further: '·there is little, if any, 
evidence that such provisions will act as a deterrent to offenders, or that offenders will 
even understand the consequences of this legislation in the process of their 
offending." 68 
V POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF THE BILL 
64 Hansard above n 44 
65 Walters and Bradley above n 35, 57 
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid 
68 Hansard above n 44 
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A Lack of Discretion 
What sets "Three Strikes" laws apart is the lack of discretion given to the 
judiciary in sentencing. The Judge presiding over one of these cases will not be 
allowed any discretion in determining the sentence. This can be a problem in some 
cases where the ability to consider all the facts of the case is required. The Law 
Society has been negative towards this aspect of the bill, labelling it a "blunt 
instrument."69 Spokesman for the society Jonathan Krebs has told the select 
committee that discretion should be left to the judiciary.70 The lack of discretion given 
to judges is illustrated by the proposed section 86D:
71 
[lfs86Dl applies the court must] .. . 
(a) impose a sentence of imprisonment for Ii fe ; and 
(b) order that the offender serve a minimum period of imprisonment under that sentence. 
(3) The court must impose a minimum period of imprisonment of 25 years unless the court is 
satisfied that it would be manifestly unjust to do so. 
The judge will now have no discretion when sentencing. As detailed in 
section II, the judge currently has guidelines to sentencing , but the 
final sentence handed down will be a matter of discretion. ow, she is 
forced by the legislation to impose a minimum twenty-five year sentence, unless " it 
would be manifestly unjust to do so".72 This is a check on the rule to avoid unjust 
results. 
69 Stuff Website www.stuff.co.nz (accessed 9/6/09) 
70 Ibid 
71 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill above n 20 s86D 
72 Ibid 
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The term "manifestly unjust" has been defined in two recent cases, R v Slade 73 
and R v Williams. 74 In R v Slade, the Court of Appeal found that it would have been 
"manifestly unjust" to impose a 17 year non-parole period. They cited various factors 
including the defendant's age, upbringing, and role in the attack (which was far less 
callous than the ringleader.)75 
In R v Williams the court noted that it was a "matter of overall intention" 
based on "demonstratable factors that withstand objective scrutiny."76 That is, the 
circumstances of the offence must be such that the case does not fall within the band 
of culpability of a qualifying murder. 77 
These two cases illustrate that there must be something special about the 
offender, or the offence, that makes the sentence "manifestly unjust." The same 
standard will most likely be applied in "Three Strikes" cases. 
B Lack of Flexibility 
In terms of the proposed "Three Strikes" legislation, this lack of discretion 
may create issues of flexibility. In the majority of cases, the court would no longer be 
able to look at specific circumstances relevant to each offender and tailor a sentence 
to fit. The sentence must be set down as stated in the bill, and very few cases will be 
able to meet the threshold required, as noted later in this essay. 
It is also well documented that without discretion available to the courts, illogical 
73 R v Slade, [2005] 2NZLR526 
74 R v Williams [2005] 2NZLR506 
75 R v Slade above n 73 para 53 
76 R v Williams above n 64 para 67 
77 Ibid 
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sentencing results may occur. This is well illustrated by a number of US cases: for 
example, Kevin Weber had two previous convictions for burglary and assault with a 
deadly weapon. He then attempted to rob a restaurant safe, and managed to get away 
with four biscuits. For this offence, he received a sentence of 25 years to life.
78 
Similarly, Leandro Andrade stole 9 videotapes from two different K Marts in 1995. 
He had previously been convicted of petty theft, burglary, transportation of marijuana 
and escape from prison. As any felony can count under California's three-strike law, 
he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life.
79 
Although extreme, these cases illustrate potential problems in utilising 
mandatory penalties. The specific list of offences in the proposed New Zealand 
legislation will ensure that such marked problems do no occur, but the core of the 
problem remains; offenders will be mandatorily punished disproportionately for their 
offending should this bill be passed. 
C Problems with Parole 
Clause 11 of the Bill amends section 20 of the Parole Act 2002:
80 
Parole eligibility date 
Section 20 is amended by adding the following subsections: 
(5) If an offender is required, by an order under section 86C(2) of the Sentencing Act 2002, to 
serve a sentence without parole, the offender-
(a) does not have a parole eligibility date in respect of the sentence; and 
(b) may not be released on parole in respect of that sentence. 
78 CNN http://edition.cnn.com (accessed 8/6/09) 
79 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) 
80 Parole Act 2002 s20 
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(6) If an offender is required, by an order under section 86E(2) or I03(2A) of the Sentencing 
Act 2002 , to serve a sentence of imprisonment for life without parole, the offender may not be 
released on parole. 
This means that any life sentence given under the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform bill will result in life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
Currently this does not exist - all offenders are allowed parole, unless they have been 
sentenced to preventive detention. This is much harsher than current sentencing law. 
Currently the non-parole period for life imprisonment is ten years, unless the court 
imposes a minimum period. 81 
So the discretion of the courts to impose minimum non-parole periods on 
offenders has been dropped in respect of three-strike offenders, in favour of a strict 
code which imposes a life long sentence, no matter how rehabilitated the offender 
becomes. This is very overbearing, and it means no matter what, a prisoner convicted 
of a third strike offence can never be released. This is an example of going beyond 
"just dese1ts". 
D Beyond "Just Deserts" 
·'Just Deserts" is a goal for sentencing. The idea is that the criminal should be 
punished for the offence(s) committed and nothing else. It is a punishment for 
wrongdoing and focuses directly on the offender. Proportionality is a big part of this 
rationale, and 'just deserts' does not claim to punish for possible future offending. 
·'Three Strikes" laws go beyond 'just deserts' and punish more harshly for past 
crimes, and perceived future crimes. The sentencing rationales being used here are 
incapacitation, and deterrence. 
81 Ibid s84(3) 
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Deterrence has long been used as a rationale for sentencing, and is an essential 
part of most criminal justice systems. 
82 However, there has always been a lack of 
empirical support as to its effects on crime, and there is still lack of agreement 
between criminologists on both the "nature and magnitude of deterrent effects."
83 
Using California's Proposition 8 as a guide, Webster, Doob and Zimring (WDZ) 
studied any deterrent effect it may have had. Proposition 8 added 5 years to a person's 
sentence if they had a prior felony conviction, and one year if they had any 
conviction, whichever was greater. It also stipulated that the court could look back 
indefinitely into the persons past, erasing the previous 10 year limitation, and required 
judges to set the sentence consecutively, not concurrently.
8
" 
Obviously this is very harsh on repeat offenders, and it would seem that people 
would be unlikely to re-offend, given such harsh consequences. Ilowever, WDZ 
found no real evidence of a decrease in crime. They concluded that there is "little 
support for marginal general deterrence of sentence severity."
85 
They further noted an interesting anomaly: "Harsher penalties such as sentence 
enhancements or the increased use of imprisonment ... seem to follow, rather than 
precede, declines in crime rates."
86 This shows there is often no connection between 
increased sentence severity and decreased crime rates. 
82 Webster, Doob, Zimring Proposition 8 and Crime Rates 2006 5 Criminology and Public Policy 418 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid 
85 Ibid 439 
86 Ibid, 440 , 
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E Offences Covered by the Proposed Law 
For an offence to be a strike offence, it must be classified as a "serious violent 
offence."87 These are defined in the act, under section 86A (1)-(37). This is good as it 
nanows the scope of the act, making it harder for non-serious offenders to fall under 
the three strikes provision, as well as increasing certainty of sentencing, which as 
noted above is imp01iant to notions of deterrence. The only offence that is not violent 
is incest. 
This list is comprehensive. It covers what most people would consider the 
most serious offences. There are some notable exceptions however. Common assault, 
theft and burglary are three crimes not included in the bill. To reach the threshold of a 
·'serious violent crime" something more is required. 
The emphasis is on violent cnme, signalling the importance of physical 
integrity and other harms. This is illustrated by the fact that a number of non-violent 
offences that could be categorised as "serious" by virtue of their high maxrnrnm 
penalties are not included. For example, drug offences are not included. Supplying 
class A drugs such as methamphetamine (P) or heroin is very serious. People who 
manufacture, import or supply drugs can indirectly cause far more damage than 
someone who commits a direct crime, for example, aggravated burglary (a "serious 
violent offence under section 86A). 88 Yet these kinds of offences are not included on 
the list. 
87 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill above n 20, S86A 
88 Ibid 
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Similarly, no "white collar" crime is included on this list. White collar crime 
can be more serious and can affect more people than "street crime". However as it is 
not classified as "violent" in nature, it will not be included in this legislation, despite 
the effects it can have on peoples Jives. "White collar" crime has always been viewed 
as less serious than violent and property crime. 
89 A popular misconception is that 
"white collar" crime is either victimless or lacks seriousness.
90 But despite the 
damage and cost "white collar" crime has inflicted in New Zealand
91
, crime-reducing 
methods are limited to violent crime. This reflects Reiman' s argument that the public 
believes that the model for crime is one person harming another, due to media 
portrayals and political rhetoric, and therefore accepts a legal system that leaves them 
unprotected against greater dangers.
92 
F The Warning System 
As the consequences of receiving a conviction under the proposed bill are very 
serious, checks and balances have been placed to soften the harsh effects. One of 
these is the warning system. Section 86B states:
93 
( l) This section applies to a qualifying sentence for a serious violent offence imposed on an 
offender ... 
89 Walters and Bradley above n 35, 155 
90 !bid 
9 1 lbid 158 
92 Ibid, 159 
93 Sen;encing and Parole Reform Bill above n20 s86B 
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(2) When the court imposes the qualifying sentence, the court must 
(a) advise the offender that the court is imposing a sentence to which this section applies and 
warn the offender of the consequences of receiving a further qualifying sentence for a further 
serious violent offence .. . 
An offender must be given warning that she has committed a serious violent 
offence. This is to increase the deterrence effect aimed for ( deterrence cannot hope to 
be effective if the consequences of further offending are unknown), as well as notions 
of fairness. 
Another warning must be given after conviction for the second offence, under 
section 86C:94 
Final warning on receiving second qualifying sentence for serious violent offence 
. .. (3) When the court imposes the qualifying sentence, the court must 
(a) advise the offender that the court is imposing a sentence to which this section applies and 
warn the offender of the consequences of receiving a further qualifying sentence for a further 
serious violent offence .. . 
Again, this serves to let the offender know the specific consequences he faces. 
However, there is no time limit on the warnings, as noted in s86F:95 
Continuing effect of warnings 
(I) An offender continues to have a record of a warning or a record of a final warning 
regardless of the effect of the sentence to which the record relates. 
94 Ibid s86C 
95 Ibid s86F 
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They continue on indefinitely, unless one of the criteria of section 86F(2) is 
met, namely, the conviction is quashed, or the defendant successfully appeals his case. 
This means an offender, once he has committed and been convicted for one "serious 
violent offence" must be careful not to commit any listed crime for the rest of his life. 
This could be viewed as extensive punishment. Even after an offender has 
served his sentence, he will have this continued warning hanging over him until he 
dies, no matter what the subsequent choices he makes in his life are. However, it does 
fit the context of the bill, going beyond just dese1is. Repeat offenders will be 
punished, no matter how far apart the commission of the offences are. 
Youth offenders are not covered by this bill. Section 86B states:
96 
(I) This section applies to a qualifying sentence for a serious violent offence imposed on 
an offender who, at the time of committing that serious violent offence, 
(a) did not have a record of a warning g iven under this section; and 
(b) was 18 years of age or over. 
This means a first warning cannot be given until the offender is 18. This is 
an interesting decision. Young offenders have been convicted of these kinds of serious 
crimes in the past. If they can be sentenced for murder or manslaughter at a young 
age, it seems interesting that they cannot be given a first warning. This decision 
subscribes to the "welfare model" for dealing with young offenders.
97 The welfare 
model aims to rehabilitate young offenders, and focuses more on their needs than 
96 Ibid s86B 
97 
Cunneen C, White R Juvenile Justice and Crime in Australia, 3
rd ed Oxford Univeristy Press 2007, 
105 
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punishment,98 as opposed to the "justice model", which focuses on due process and 
just deserts, with rehabilitation as a secondary goal.99 
G Effects of the "Three Strikes" Law in California and tlze Likelihood of 
Those Effects Being Felt Here 
We can examine the effects of the law in other jurisdictions where it has been 
enacted. As discussed earlier in this paper, the manifestation of the ideas behind the 
law, and therefore the law itself, will be different from place to place. California is the 
most famous example of the "Three Strikes" legislation. Although the overall 
intention remains the same, an extended sentence on the second offence, followed by 
a larger extended sentence on the third strike, the California law punishes different 
offences than the proposed New Zealand legislation. The provision is more broadly 
drafted, including all felony offences, not just those of "serious violence". 
1 Effect on Prison Population 
At the time of implementation of the "three strikes" law in California, there 
were fears that the prison population would grow uncontrollably. Some estimates saw 
the prison population reaching 250,000 inmates by 1999. 100 Other estimates projected 
that it would increase the population by 100,000 inmates by 2003, taking the 
population to 215,000. 101 
98 Ibid I 06 
99 Ibid , 
100 Zimring Hawkins and Kamin above n 3, 134 
10 1 
Legislative Analyst's Office above n 6 (accessed 8/6/09) 
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However, by 2004 the pnson population had only increased by some 60,000 
offenders, not as large an increase as many had feared. Still , since the implementation 
of the three strikes law, the California prison population has grown rapidly.
102 From 
1994 - 2004, over 87,500 second or third strike offenders were sent to prison. In 
2004, there were still 43,000 of those inmates in prison, making up 26% of the 
offenders - clearly a large increase. 
This less than expected increase has been put down to several factors; one 
example being put forward is the use of discretion by prosecutors.
103 The prosecutors 
are accepting plea deals for lesser, non-felony offences in order to avoid the 
legislation. 
Also note in California that 56% of these three-strikes offenders are in jail for 
non-serious or non-violent crimes, such as theft.
10
-1 This could not occur in New 
Zealand because of our strict list on the bill. A possible reason for this is given by the 
Legislative Analyst's Office: "It is likely that these figures somewhat under-report the 
percentage of strikers whose current offense activity was actually serious or violent. 
This could occur in some cases because district attorneys choose to prosecute strikers 
for non-serious, nonviolent offenses that may be easier to prove in court, presumably 
to make it easier to secure a conviction, knowing that the Three Strikes sentence 
enhancement will still apply. The extent to which this occurs is unknown."
105 This 
will affect the crime rate statistics - if prosecutors are processing violent crimes as 
102 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
103 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
104 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
105 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
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non-violent crimes, the number of violent crimes recorded will appear to be lower 
than it actually is. 
The prison population will certainly increase because of the increased length of 
sentences. The Sentencing and Parole (Reform) Bill provides that the offender must 
be given the maximum sentence on the second strike, and 25 years to life on the third 
strike. This means prisoners will be staying in prison for longer. In California this has 
been noted too - from 1994 when the law was implemented, to 2004, the average 
prison stay increased 19%. 106 As well, the average age of prisoners has increased, 
from 32 in 1994 to 36 in 2004, as well as a trebling of prisoners aged over 50, up to 
16,300. 107 
This is against a background of New Zealand being one of the most punitive 
nations in the world, using the data of prison population per 100,000 people. In fact 
New Zealand as of 2008 has the seventh highest population per capita in the OECD 
with 155 people per 100,000 cunently incarcerated. 108 75% of OECD countries have 
rates less than 140 people per 100,000 imprisoned. In 2005 , New Zealand had a rate 
of 184 per 100,000 people in jail, the second highest in the world behind only the 
United States. 109 
John Pratt argues in his article "The Dark Side of Paradise" that New Zealand has 
always been a punitive country, despite often having equal or lower crime rates than 
106 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
107 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
108 New Zealand Statistics www.stats.govt.nz (accessed 7/7/2009) 
109 Pratt above n 40, 542 
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other countries such as England.
11° From 1990 - 2000 there was a decline in crime 
rates and in 2000, the rate of homicides was far lower in New Zealand than m 
Australia and England, yet imprisonment rates stayed level, or rose. 
111 
John Pratt links this latest rise to populist forces, including lobby groups such as 
the Sensible Sentencing Trust, talk-back radio, "victims turned heroes", and fringe 
political parties allowed in by MMP.
112 This means that even as crime rates fall, the 
symbolic importance of punishment increases.
113 
A 2008 Law Commission paper states that without a 25% reduction in sentence 
lengths, 1137 additional beds would be required.
114 The "three strikes" law will 
increase the lengths, not decrease them, meaning far more space for prisoners will be 
required. This will result in increased costs to the public. 
In California, the cost for keeping these prisoners behind bars is estimated to be 
$1.5b US annually. Taking into account those that would be in prison anyway, the 
cost drops to about $500m US, as well as the construction of 7 new prisons, at a cost 
of $1.8b US. 115 However, there are always problems with estimating the costs, such as 
. . . d·f·c. 1 i 16 apport10nmg increases to 1 1erent aws. 
110 Ibid 545 
Ill Ibid 
11 2 Ibid 
11 3 Ibid 
114 Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform NZ Law Commission Website www.lawcom.govt.nz 
accessed 7/7/2009 
115 Legislative Analyst's Office above n 6 (accessed 8/6/09) 
116 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
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There will be other indirect cost effects, such as taxes which would have been 
paid, or costly (in terms of health care for the victim, court processes and so on) 
crimes that may have been committed had the offender not been in jail. These factors 
are difficult to measure. 11 7 
John Pratt argues public money should not be spent this way. The increased 
rate of incarceration, as well as the extra burden on our penal system, comes at a cost 
to our health and education spending. He goes on to say that privatising prisons will 
not save the public money, and that "no responsible government can give such blank-
cheque guarantees in the global credit crisis." 118 There is no need for this huge 
expense when the laws needed are already in place. 
2 Effect on the courts 
There were two main effects on the courts in California. One was the pressure 
put on the Supreme Court, which had to decide the scope and legality of the new 
law. 11 9 This will not apply to the same extent in New Zealand, because our Supreme 
Court cannot rule on legislation. However, all the courts will feel the effects because 
of offenders pursuing their cases far more vigorously. More offenders will fight their 
convictions harder, because of the decreased incentives for pleading guilty, and the 
more severe punishment that will follow a guilty verdict. 120 
11 7 Ibid (accessed 6/8/09) 
11 8 Stuff Website above n 28 (accessed 9/7 /09) 
11 9 Zimring Hawkins and Kamin above n 3, 125 
120 Ibid 
32 
Early estimates for the effect on the California court system were dire. 
It was projected thatjury trials would more than double in the first two years.
121 What 
actually transpired was far less. The additional workload of the courts varied from 
10% to 25%.
122 This is partially because prosecutors were flexible, accepting plea 
bargains for lesser offences.
123 The offender would plead guilty in exchange for the 
offence being changed to a non-strike offence, reducing the amount of trials needed. 
This could also hold true in New Zealand, for example reducing a charge of wounding 
with intent to assault in return for a guilty plea. 
However, in New Zealand, the court system is already under considerable 
stress. Cases can take months to begin, and then more time for the case to be resolved. 
In 1997, 76 percent of cases were disposed of within 52 weeks; that figure fell to 63 
percent in 2000, and 67.5 percent in 2002.
124 There are many reasons cited for this, 
included under-prepared and under-informed litigants and defendants, overall 
workload, and the unavailability of judge time.
125 A 10 - 25% increase in the number 
of cases could have a huge effect on the court system, resulting in further increased 
delays, greater inefficiency and higher costs. 
Ten years on, the amount of court cases has increased by 10%.
126 Again, the 
reason given is more offenders going to trial , given the lesser incentives for pleading 
guilty, and the hope that they can avoid the conviction altogether.
127 In ew Zealand, 
121 Ibid 126 
122 Ibid 
123 Ibid 127 
124 NZ Law Commission Website www.lawcom .govt.nz accessed 7/7/2009 
125 Ibid 
126 Legislative Analyst's Office above n 6 (accessed 6/8/09) 
127 Ibid (accessed 6/8/09) 
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where the median waiting time for a trial in 2007 was 290 days in the High Court and 
256 days in the District Courts 128, this could be a serious burden. 129 
3 Effect on Crime Rates 
Crime rates have dropped 111 California since 1994. From 1994 to 1997, 
homicides dropped 40.2%, rapes dropped 17.1 %, and robberies dropped 38.7%. 130 
Between 1994 and 1999, the crime rate fell 4 3 %. 131 
It is hard to estimate how much of this is attributable to the "Three Strikes" 
law though. For example, the overall crime rate was already declining - from 1990 to 
1994 it dropped 10%. 132 As well as this, the crime rate actually increased from 1999 -
2004, by 11 %. 133 
The national cnme figures also show declines in cnme over this period. 
National crime rates fell 31 % between 1991 and 2003, with violent crime dropping 
37%. 134 Comparing Los Angeles to other cities shows that crime has dropped just as 
much without the "Three Strikes" laws. In New York, it fell even further. 135 
Kim Workman, director of Rethinking Crime and Punishment, puts it this 
way:136 
128 Voxy News Website www.voxy.co.nz (accessed 9/8/09) 
129 Law Commisson above n 124 
130 Zimring Hawkins and Kamin above n 3, 86 
131 Legislative Analyst's Office above n 6 (accessed 6/8/09) 
132 Ibid (accessed 6/8/09) 
133 Ibid (accessed 6/8/09) 
134 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
135 Zimring Hawkins and Kamin above n 3, 89 
136 Scoop NZ www.scoop.eo.nz/ (accessed 6/8/09) 
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California's decline in crime compared with the national average, presents another picture. 
New York, not California, showed the sharpest decline in crime during the time in question . 
New York does not have three strikes legislation . Canada experienced a similar national crime 
drop. It does not have three strikes, and imprisons people at a rate half that of New Zealand. 
There is also conflicting evidence from California itself.
137 
Even in California, the results were unclear ... Californian counties that aggressively enforced 
the law had no greater declines in crime than did counties that used it far more sparingly. One 
study found that crime dropped by 21.3% in the six most lenient 'three strikes' counties, compared 
to a 12.7% drop in the toughest counties. 
Workman states on the effects: "If the truth be known, no one really knows." 1
38 It 
is very difficult to tell the overall effect of the legislation then, given the overall drop 
in crime throughout the nation, and the inconsistent results within California. 
John Pratt points to evidence in the crime rates in the United States which 
show that crime has decreased, but has also decreased in Canada, with no three strikes 
laws and a prison rate of only 116 per 100,000 of population, far lower than the 753 
per 100,000 in the USA. He also notes that the biggest drop in violent crime in the 
USA has been in New York, with no three strikes legislation. 
139 
H Possible Effects of Life Without Parole 
Another effect the bill could have is on offenders who have just committed 
their third offence, but have not been apprehended. Faced with life imprisonment 
137 LA Criminal Defense Biog www.lacriminaldefenseblog.com (accessed 6/8/09) 
138 Scoop NZ above n 136 (accessed 6/8/09) 
139 Stuff Website above n 28 (accessed 9/7 /09) 
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instead of the previous sentence for the offence, some these offenders will try 
anything to avoid capture. They have nothing to lose at this point, as apprehension 
and conviction will see them in prison for the rest of their lives. They may go on to 
commit several more offences to evade a1Test, putting the public at more risk, as well 
as the police trying to apprehend them. 140 
The bill will have massive consequences for those convicted and imprisoned 
for life without parole. Life without parole is frequently cited as the second harshest 
punishment possible, behind only the death penalty. 141 
The purpose of a sentence of life without parole is protection of the public. It 
has a populist motive as well, as shown in Alabama, where it was made into law in 
order to stop the "revolving door". 142 However difficulties often lie in predicting 
future dangerousness based on past crimes. Different systems use different methods of 
risk assessment. Some use actuarial methods, looking at statistics of offenders in 
similar circumstances, while some use psychological reports. Some systems, such as 
in England, combine the two. 143 However, it is noted that risk factors are by nature 
imprecise, particularly when dealing with violent and sexual offenders. 144 Studies 
show that in some cases a sentence of life with out parole would not have protected or 
b fi d . h·1 . . 1 145 ene 1te society, w 1 e 111curnng arge costs. 
140 Ibid (accessed 8/6/09) 
141 Appleton and Grover above n 52, 597 
142 Ibid , 603 
143 Kemshell above n 23 , 70 
144 Ibid, 72 
145 Appleton and Grover above n 52, 604 
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Two effects of a life without parole sentence are shown in the article "The 
Pros and Cons of Life without Parole."
146 The first is the problem of aging prisoners. 
If a prisoner has no chance of parole, they will inevitably grow old and die in jail. 
This leads to an increasing need for medical and geriatric care. There is virtually 
no 
public safety in keeping these elderly people in prison, but it is very costly too 
the 
bl
. 147 
pu lC. 
The second problem is "superinmates."
148 These are defined as uncontrollable 
irnnates who have nothing to lose, and nothing to gain. The key issue is providi
ng 
constructive and safe schemes for these prisoners, as well as the prisoners in jail w
ith 
them. This can be very difficult, as there is no incentive of parole to ensure go
od 
behaviour.
149 
Appleton and Grover go on to say that life without parole is seen as a good 
political alternative. It is not as harsh as the death penalty but is still viewed as being 
"tough on crime".
150 Some argue that there is effectively no distinction between the 
two - both take a life and render it useless to society.
151 
I Human Rights Issues 
The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights 
Act 1990, section 9 in particular. 
146 Ibid, 597 
147 Ibid, 604 
148 Ibid 
149 Ibid 
150 Ibid 605 
15 1 Ibid: 606 
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Section 9 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides: "Everyone has the right not 
to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment 
I -2 or punishment." :, In Tawnoa v Attorney-General, the Supreme Court held that the 
"disproportionately severe" meant punishment grossly disproportionate to the 
. 153 circumstances. 
The Attorney-General, Hon Clu·istopher Finlayson has written a repo11 on the 
inconsistencies of the bill with section 9 of the Bill of Rights Act. He notes some of 
the consequences of the bill: 154 
An offender who is subject to s 860 who commits a third listed offence and would otherwise 
be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and who does not satisfy the high threshold of 
manifest injustice, will receive a life sentence with a 25 year non-parole period ... 
He goes on to point out that two people convicted of the same offence, but at 
different stages in their criminal career, will receive sentences varying from 5 years to 
life imprisonment, while parole eligibility could be from one year eight months to 25 
years. 155 He concludes that: 156 
I consider that the differential treatment for offenders, and in particular the imposition of a life 
sentence for offences that would otherwise be subject to a penalty of as little as five years, 
based on whether they have been previously convicted of listed offences and warned in terms 
152 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s9 
153 Hon Christopher Finlayson "Interim Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill" Published by Order of the House of 
Representatives, Wellington, 2009 
154 Ibid, pat1 l I 
155 lbid,pa1112 
156 Ibid, part 15 
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of cl 5 may result in disparities between offenders that are not ration
ally based. The regime 
may also result in gross disproportionality in sentencing. For these 
reasons I consider the 
proposed regime raises an apparent inconsistency with the Bill of Right
s Act. 
The Attorney-General, however, thinks that if the second or third s
trike 
offence is that of murder, the punishment will not be grossly disproportion
ate: 157 
The distinction in treatment between offenders who may otherwise ha
ve received a sentence 
of life with a minimum parole period of I O years, but who instead r
eceive a minimum non 
parole period of25 years, is disproportionate. I am not however satisfi
ed that this would meet 
the test of grossly disproportionate in terms of s9. 
This is questionable. I would argue that 15 years extra of non-parole 
time 
based on prior conduct is severely disproportionate. That, of course, will 
be up to the 
Supreme Court to decide if the situation arises. 
Chief Human Rights Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan has misgivings abou
t the 
bill. She notes that the bill breaches the Bill of Rights Act, and p
ossibly the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
158 However because of ew 
Zealand's almost unique constitutional make up, legislation can be passed
 even if it is 
inconsistent with our Human Rights legislation. It is still interesting to
 note these 
problems however. 
VI CONCLUSION 
157 Ibid, part 18 
158 Stuff Website above n 28 (accessed 9/6/09) 
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There are many problems with the Sentencing and Parole (Reform) Bill. It 
began as a "get tough on crime" campaign promise by the ACT party, and has become 
a very controversial bill. 
It is certainly tough on crime, but disproportionately so. It is inconsistent with 
the Bill of Rights Act. It is based on an unproven deterrent policy, and has had 
questionable effect in jurisdictions where it has been enacted. It takes sentencing 
discretion out of the hands of those who are most experienced at it, the courts, and 
gives it to the legislature. It will raise costs for both the prison system and the court 
system, without proven benefits. 
It seems to be an unapologetically populist campaign tool to get votes, while 
ignoring the real issues of repeat -offenders. 
My recommendation is to scrap the bill. This country already has the power to 
punish repeat offenders in the Sentencing Act 2002, but with far greater flexibility and 
the ability to tailor the sentence to the crime. The "three strikes" bill is a blunt 
instrument, which will be ineffective at curtailing crime in New Zealand. 
Word count: 8510 not including title page, footnotes, table of contents and 
bibliography. 
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